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Abstract
Four axioms are introduced in order to characterize the family of pair-based decomposable
inequality measures, which is embraced in the family of weakly decomposable inequality measures.
Three axioms, namely, normalization by pairs, aggregation by pairs, and decomposition by pairs
enable the pair-based family of inequality measures to be deduced and to be decomposed into
within- and between-group components. Those components are built on population share weights,
which are characterized by the three above-mentioned axioms. The weights have the particularity
to be unique and to sum to unity. By invoking the fourth axiom of symmetry by pairs, it is
proved that pair-based inequality measures and their two components are U statistics, so that,
statistical information may be inferred.
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1I. Introduction
For more than thirty years, decomposable inequality measures have been modeled on the basis of
stringent axioms. Particularly, the additive decomposition axiom, i.e., the canonical decomposition
introduced by Shorrocks (1980), has played an important role (see also Bourguignon (1979) for a
less demanding requirement, i.e., the aggregation principle). It is common practice, for empirical
investigations, to partition the population into many closed groups.1 In this respect, the use of the
additive decomposition axiom brings out two elements, namely, a within-group component of income
inequality and a between-group component of income inequality. Although this axiom provides the
ability to characterize many operational indices available to address various empirical inquiries, the
very drawback of this principle of decomposition lies in the nature of the between-group component,
which exhibits an estimator based on the mean incomes of the groups only. As mentioned, e.g. in
Abatemarco (2010), the crude structure of such a between-group component may lead to progressive
(rich-to-poor) transfers, when they occur between members of distinct groups, that increase income
inequalities between those groups.
Starting from the idea that inequality measures should be grounded on accurate between-group
components as well as relevant between-group transfers, Ebert (2010) introduced a class (family) of
weakly decomposable inequality measures embracing the usual variance, the variance of logarithms
and Gini's mean dierence, among others. The merit of Ebert's (2010) approach is undeniably the
important degree of freedom resulting from his characterization principally based on two axioms,
namely aggregation and decomposition. Weakly decomposable inequality measures produce within-
and between-group components by weighting the inequality measures related to each group and the
inequality measures computed between each group pairwise, respectively.
In the sequel, contrary to Ebert's contribution, focus is precisely put on the weighting scheme
arising from the characterization of weakly decomposable inequality measures, i.e., the weights at-
tached to within- and between-group inequality measures that bring out within- and between-group
components, respectively. These weights are for instance population shares. These could have been
imposed a priori. For example, one of the rst Gini decomposition introduced by Bhattacharya and
Mahalanobis in 1967 consisted in taking population shares per group and to multiply those weights
by the inequality computed on each group in order to deduce a within-group Gini component. This
procedure is a tantamount to obtain a between-group component as a residual, i.e., by dierence
between the overall inequality and the within-group component.2 On the contrary, these weights, as
outlined in the paper, may be grounded on two principles: the aggregation of individual inequalities
and the decomposition of the overall inequality. These axioms are, namely, aggregation by pairs and
decomposition by pairs. Compared with Ebert's approach, postulating two new (but related) axioms
of aggregation and decomposition enables weights to be precisely characterized. The aggregation
by pairs is specied by taking the income inequalities between each and every pairs of agents. The
1Contrary to the deprivation literature, in which individuals compare their income to any given person belonging to
particular groups they choose, that is, opened groups, the dierent groups are xed a priori in the paper, being e.g.,
male/female, age groups, etc. These are, on the contrary, closed groups (obviously, being disjoint and exhaustive).
2To be precise, it is the third between-group component (the overlapping term), which is obtained by dierence. See
Deutsch and Silber (1999) for an exhaustive classication about within- and between-group components issued from
the Gini decomposition.
2decomposition by pairs postulates that, in the population, the whole inequality is the consequence of
the inequalities emerging from each and every pairs of groups' income vectors. The class of inequal-
ity measures characterized by those principles is called pair-based decomposable inequality measures,
which is embraced in the family of weakly decomposable inequality measures.3
 The pair-based inequality measures have the particularity to yield a unique weighting scheme.
These weights wkk and wkh, associated with within- and between-group inequality measures respec-
tively, sum to unity { this particularity does not hold systematically for all weakly decomposable
inequality measures.
 The characterization is managed with a high degree of freedom since only three 'pair-based'
axioms are introduced. In particular, the principle of population traditionally used in this literature
to compare distributions of heterogeneous sizes is relaxed. As it will be pointed out at the end
of the paper, those pair-based axioms may be combined with traditional requirements in order to
decompose well-known indices { an illustration will be performed with Gini's mean dierence.
 The fact that the weighting scheme is unique with weights summing to unity has direct impli-
cations. Utilizing one additional axiom { symmetry by pairs { the inequality measures (as well as
the inequality components) are proved to be U statistics. In words, pair-based inequality measures
are asymptotically normal.
The aim of this note is to prove the three above-mentioned points. I present the notations and
the axioms in Sections II and III, respectively. In Section IV, I expose the main results. Finally, I
close in Section V.
II. Notations
Let N := f0;1;2;:::;ng be the set of nonnegative integers and let N := N n f0g. Let Rk
+ be the
k dimensional nonnegative Euclidean space (Rk
++ its positive part, k 2 N). A pair-based inequality
measure is dened to be a function I : Rk
+Rh
+ ! R+, 8k;h 2 N, computed both on k dimensional
and h dimensional income vectors xk := (x1;x2;:::;xn(xk)), xh := (x1;x2;:::;xn(xh)), where n(xk)
[resp. n(xh)] denotes the size of the vector xk [resp. xh]. The population of size n(x)  n is
partitioned into K groups of size n(xk) with income vectors xk, for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. I also note
xik [resp. xjh], the income of the i th person being in group k [resp. the income of the j th person
in group h]. I shall use in the remainder of the paper: I(xk;xk) for within-group inequality measures,
I(xk;xh) for between-group inequality measures 8k 6= h 2 f1;:::;Kg, and I(x;x) for the overall
inequality measure. A n(xk) dimensional vector of ones [resp. zeros] is symbolized by 1n(xk) [resp.
On(xk)]. Finally, k is a n(xk)  n(xk) permutation matrix.
3Many materials were oered in the literature in a dierent manner to bring in either: the existence of another type
of decomposition rule or the concept of pair-based inequality measures. On the one hand, Chameni (2006) introduced
the Gini of order  (G
) { G
 is actually equivalent to the one-parameter family of inequality measure ^ K
" characterized
by Ebert (2010) { and demonstrated that G
 and the coecient of variation squared are based on the same structure
of decomposition, relying on three components. On the other hand, Kolm (1999) introduced the pair-based inequality
measures, conceived as the aggregation of inequalities between each and every pairs of incomes. Contrary to Kolm
(1999) and Chameni (2006), the merit of Ebert's (2010) contribution is to carry out a proper axiomatic foundation to
capture both concepts.
3III. Axioms Based on Pairwise Combinations
III.1. Four axioms
All pair-based inequality indices are normalized. When the inequality is computed over two identical
and egalitarian income vectors (not necessarily of the same size), the pair-based inequality measure
takes always the same value:
Axiom III.1 NorMalization by Pairs:
I(xk;xh) = " if xk = c  1n(xk) and xh = c  1n(xh); 8k;h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg; and ";c 2 R+ : (NMP)
In order to respect a minimal principle of justice, the pair-based inequality measures are imposed
to be symmetric in group pairs. This is a traditional anonymity principle postulating that the
pair-based inequality measure does not depend on how individuals are labeled within each group:
Axiom III.2 SYMmetry by Pairs:
I (xk;xh) = I (kxk;hxh) for all k;h 2 f1;:::;Kg : (SYMP)
As shown in the proof in Appendix, this principle is not necessary to derive the main result. The
SYMP axiom implies however more concern for statistical inference (see Corollary (IV.1)).
The pair-based inequality indices are aggregative by income pairs:










A for all k;h 2 f1;:::;Kg ; (AGGP)
for any given function f ( ; n(xk);n(xh)) such as f : R+ ! R+.
The overall pair-based inequality measure (computed over the entire population) is decomposable
by group pairs. Formally:







where wkh is the weight associated with the pair-based inequality measure I(xk;xh).
The decomposition by pairs enables particular (and sometimes between-group) income transfers to
be performed since it captures all inequalities between the members of dierent groups (as well as
those of the same group, see e.g. Abatemarco (2010) for the between-group Gini index case). It
is worth mentioning that these pair-based income inequalities are rather dicult to exhibit with
traditional measures based on additive decomposability, see Shorrocks (1980).4
4Chameni (2006) proved however that particular additive decomposable indices bring out all pairwise income dif-
ferences, such as the coecient of variation squared.
4III.2. Some Remarks
Before outlining the central result, it is interesting to remember the two main axioms introduced by
Ebert (2010) underlying the family of weakly decomposable inequality measures.
On the one hand, Ebert (2010) uses the following axiom of AGGregation:




After adding one person in the population, the new overall inequality is composed of the previous
inequality plus the inequality between the additional person and the rest of the population { as-
sociated with the weights (n + 1) and (n + 1), respectively. Accordingly, pairwise combinations
are captured in the second term. AGGP yields the same idea since the inequality within (between)
groups is the sum of all pairwise inequalities within (between) the agents' income of the group(s)
{ up to the transformation f. However, AGGP does not provide a priori distinct weights such as
(n+1) and (n+1). The axiomatic characterization, proposed in Theorem IV.1 below, will embody
those weights via the role of the f function.
On the other hand, Ebert's (2010) axiom of DEComposition is:







where 1, 2 are the weights associated with the within-group inequality measures and  the weight
associated with the between-group inequality measures. Contrary to DEC, DECP postulates a
common weight wkh available for each and every pairs of groups k;h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg, where wkk and
wkh are the weights attached to within- and between-group inequality measures, respectively. As
mentioned above, those weights should be expected to follow from the axiomatic characterization.
In the sequel, it is shown that the intersection between the axioms AGGP, DECP and NM enables
those weights to be precisely found, for which some evident asymptotical results follow.
IV. Results





+ ! R+ j I respects NMP, AGGP and DECP
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2 = 1 :
Proof.
See the Appendix.
The use of the three axioms NMP, AGGP, and DECP yields (see Step 1 (S1.f) in the proof) the








Following equation (1) and DECP, four attractive features related to the pair-based inequality mea-
sures may be itemized:
(i) This family is decomposable by pairs of groups' income such that full information about the
shape of the distributions of the groups may be captured, whereas the canonical decomposition is
limited to mean incomes of the groups only. On the one hand, the information is related to income





















where Iw and Ibp represent the within- and the between-group inequality components, respectively.
On the other hand, the information is related to income inequalities between income pairs (via the



























The rst term Iw denotes the inequality between each and every pairs of income within each group
of the population and Ibp represents the inequality between each and every pairs of incomes drawn
from each and every pairs of groups.
(ii) The induction reasoning exposed in the Step 2 of the proof (See the Appendix, Theorem
IV.1) entails a high degree of freedom. Indeed, few axioms are used to perform the characterization.
Usually, the Population Principle (PP) is invoked in order to extend the set of individuals from 1 to
n 2 N.5 In this approach the PP is removed. Besides, it is respected by many inequality indices as
those presented in the third point below.
5Let x = fx1;x2;:::;xng. Concatenating ` times the x vector yields: x
(`) = fx1;:::;x1 | {z }
` times
;:::;xn;:::;xn | {z }
` times
g. If the
inequality measure satises the population principle, then:
I(x
(`)) = I(x); for all ` 2 N
 n f1g : (PP)
6(iii) The class D produces similar results compared with Ebert's family of weakly decomposable
inequality measures, since D comprises, among others, Gini's Mean Dierence (GMD), the Variance































" ; for all "  1 and n(x)  1 :
On the contrary, D does not embrace all weakly decomposable inequality measures such as the Gini
index of order "  1 (see Chameni (2006) and the equivalent family ^ K" introduced by Ebert, 2010),
for which the weights may be based on income shares and population shares that do not always sum
to unity. Subsequently, the pair-based inequality measures constitute a subset of the family of weakly
decomposable inequality measures.
(iv) Another feature related to D is the possibility to combine traditional axioms of the inequality
measurement literature so that inequality indices are completely characterized and decomposed into
subgroups. Let me take the simple example of the characterization of the GMD decomposition. For
that purpose, three well-known axioms are introduced:
Axiom IV.1 NorMalization to 1:
I(xk;xh) = 1 whenever xk = 1n(xk) and xh = On(xh) ; for all k 6= h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : (NM1)
Axiom IV.2 HOMogeneity of degree 1:
I(xk;xh) = I(xk;xh) ; for all  2 R++ and k;h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : (HOM1)
Axiom IV.3 INVariance:
Ib(xk + 1n(xk);xh + 1n(xh)) = Ib(xk;xh) ; for all  2 R and k;h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg : (INV)
Axiom IV.4 SYMmetry in Groups:
I (xk;xh) = I (xh;xk) for all k;h 2 f1;:::;Kg : (SYMG)
These axioms enable the between-group Gini Mean Dierence to be characterized. The decom-
position of the overall Gini Mean Dierence follows directly:
It would have been possible to use PP in the characterization of wkh in Theorem IV.1. Then, instead of invoking
equally distributed income vectors such as xk = xh, it would have been sucient to invoke equally distributed income
vectors for each group without imposing xk = xh. The proof can obtained upon the request of the author.
7Proposition IV.1 Let I be a pair-based inequality measure, i.e., I 2 D.








jxik   xjhj ; 8k 6= h :











































As can be seen in this result, because of the structure of the pair-based inequality measures, it
is only sucient to characterize either the between-group index or the within-group one since their
structure is similar. Indeed, by denition of any pair-based inequality measure I 2 D, I(xk;xh) =
I(xk;xk) if xk = xh. Consequently, once GMD(xk;xk) or GMD(xk;xh) has been characterized, the
decomposition of GMD(x;x) into GMDw and GMDbp follows directly (see Theorem IV.1).
(v) Although the symmetry by pairs (SYMP) has not been invoked in the characterization of D,
SYMP enables asymptotic properties to be inferred:
Corollary IV.1 Consider all pair-based decomposable inequality measures I 2 D satisfying SYMP.
Choose a n(x) dimensional sample partitioned into K disjoint i.i.d. subsamples of size n(xk) [n(xk)
being suciently large] for all k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg, then the unbiased estimators ^ I(x;x), ^ I(xk;xh) for




The D class of weakly decomposable inequality measures is characterized with a few conditions.
Actually, three axioms are laid down about the structure of the function f and the weights wkh. The
class D implies the existence of within- and between-group inequality components built on weights
being unique and summing to one. Then, the overall inequality measure is a convex combination of
8within- and between-group inequality measures. The well-suited feature relying on the D class of
pair-based inequality measures is the possibility to rewrite the pair-based inequality components (Iw
and Ibp) with within- and between-group inequality measures associated with the weights wkk and
wkh, where wkh = wkk if k = h.
It follows the existence of a sub-family of D that respects SYMP, for which within- and between-
group measures [I(xk;xk), I(xk;xh)] as well as within- and between-group inequality components
(Iw, Ipb) are U statistics. In consequence, normality is captured and the variance of within- and




I proceed in two steps. The rst step consists in determining linearity of the f function and its
constant. Step 2 provides the wkh weights that sum to unity.
Step 1: I proceed in splitting Step 2 in two parts: (i) an induction reasoning with just one group
in the population, and (ii), an induction reasoning with two groups in the population.





















 n(x) = 1: Consider one person in the population (group k) with income xi, hence:
I(xi;xi) = f (I(xi;xi)) () f = IdR+ ; if n(x) = 1 : (S1.a)
 n(x) = 2: Suppose the population is composed of two individuals i and j only, with income
xi = xj such as i and j belong to the sole group k. Applying AGGP to I(xk;xk) or equivalently
to I(x;x) produces:
I(xk;xk) = I(x;x) = f (I(xi;xi) + I(xi;xj) + I(xj;xi) + I(xj;xj)) = f (4I(xi;xj)) :
As xi = xj, invoking NMP gives:
I(x;x) = " = I(xj;xi) :
It follows that:
I(xj;xi) = f (4I(xi;xj)) () " = f (4") :
The f function is dened as f ( ; n(x);n(x)), such as f : R+ ! R+ and n(x) = 2. Letting






2n(x)  t :
(S1.b)
9The unique solution being consistent with Eq.(S1.a) is the rst solution of Eq.(S1.b). Indeed,
substituting n(x) = 1 into f(t) = 1
n(x)n(x)t brings out f(t) = t, for all t 2 R+. On the contrary,
plugging n(x) = 1 into the second solution of Eq.(S1.b), i.e., f(t) = 1
2n(x)  t gives f(t) = 1
2  t,




 t; for all t 2 R+ and n(x) 2 f1;2g : (S1.c)




 t; for all t 2 R+ and n(x) 2 f1;2;:::;n   1g : (S1.d)
 n(x) = n: Suppose now that n individuals have the same income: x1 =  = xi = xj =  = xn.
I deduce from AGGP and NMP, as before, that:









 t; for all t 2 R+ and n(x) 2 N : (S1.e)
Equation (S1.a) respects the relation depicted in equation (S1.c). As equation (S1.c) is true and
equation (S1.e) is also true, thus equation (S1.e) is true for all integers n 2 N. Remembering
that one group was postulated (that is x = xk), thereby the solution may be rewritten for any




 t; for all t 2 R+ ; for all k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg and n(xk) 2 N : (S1.f)
(ii) I now consider two groups in the population with income vectors x1 and x2.
 n(x1) = n(x2) = 1: Consider one person per group (i in group 1 and j in group 2), i.e., xi1 and
xj2, respectively. Using AGGP and the same reasoning as point (i) provides:
I(xi1;xj2) = f (I(xi1;xj2)) () f = IdR+ if n(x1) = n(x2) = 1 : (S1.g)
 n(x1) = n(x2) = 2: Considering equal incomes for both groups, i.e. x11 = x21 = x12 = x22,
yields from NMP I(xi1;xj2) = " for all i;j 2 f1;2g. Thus:
I(xi1;xj2) = " = I(x1;x2) = f (4I(xi1;xj2)) () " = f (4") :






n(x1)+n(x2)  t :
(S1.h)
Remark again that the second solution in (S1.h) can be dropped since it contradicts (S1.g)
[just replace n(x1) and n(x2) by 1].
10 n(x1) = n1   1, (x2) = n2   1: Consider the solution is true for any given n(x1) 2 f1;2;:::;n1 




t for all t 2 R+; n(x1) 2 f1;2;:::;n1 1g; n(x2) 2 f1;2;:::;n2 1g: (S1.i)
 n(x1) = n1, n(x2) = n2: Suppose that incomes are identical for both group: x11 =  = xi1 =
 = xn11 = x12 = ::: = xj2 =  = xn22. I deduce from AGGP and NMP that:









A = f (n1n2  I(xi1;xj2)) :




 t ; for all t 2 R+ and n(x1); n(x2) 2 N : (S1.j)
Equation (S1.g) respects the rst relation depicted in (S1.h). As (S1.h) is true and (S1.j) is
also true, thus equation (S1.j) is true for all integers in N. Remark that the result is available




t for all t 2 R+ ; for all k 6= h 2 f1;:::;Kg and n(x1); n(x2) 2 N : (S1.k)
 Recap: Merging now the results of (i) and (ii), that is, equations (S1.f) and (S1.k), the most




t; for all t 2 R+; for all h;k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg and n(xk);n(xh) 2 N : (S1)
From (S1), it is clear that f is monotone, consequently f 1 exists. Therefore, I can proceed to
Step 2.
















As f 1 : R+ ! R+ is valued to be f 1(t) = [n(x)]












































































































h=1 wkh = 1. This completes the proof.
Proof.
Proposition IV.1:
({) Necessity: Let  : R+  R+ ! R+ be a pair-based inequality index being in the D set that
satises NM1, HOM1, INV and SYMG. Suppose two groups in the population with one person per
group: xk = xk and xh = xh, K = 2. Invoking INV leads to: (xk;xh) = (xk + ;xh + ).
Let  =  xh [or  =  xk], thus: (xk;xh) = (xk   xh;0) [resp. (xk;xh) = (0;xh   xk)]. Let
 = xk   xh > 0 [or  = xh   xk if xh > xk], hence by HOM1: (xk;xh) = (xk   xh)(1;0)
[resp. (xk;xh) = (xh   xk)(0;1)]. From NM1, (1;0) = 1 [resp. (0;1) = 1 by SYMG], therefore:
(xk;xh) = (xk   xh) [resp. (xk;xh) = (xh   xk)]. By SYMG, this yields: (xk;xh) = jxk   xhj =









jxik   xjhj = GMD(xk;xh) ; 8k 6= h :
({) Suciency: It is left for the reader.









12where F(x) represents the c.d.f. of the population of size m(x). SYMP implies I(x;y) to be a
'kernel' for (F), i.e., a symmetric function (in its two rst arguments here). Consequently, following
the standard results in this literature, see e.g. Hoeding (1948), or Schechtman (2005) for related
















 =: ^ I(x;x)  I(x;x) ;
where A is the number of unordered subsets of m(x) integers taken without replacement among
the set of n(x) elements. U is asymptotically normal when n(x) is suciently large. Hence, its
variance may be computed. Of course, additional information about the structure of the kernel is
required, e.g., one has to check whether I is an unbiased estimator for  in order to get precisely the
expectation and the standard deviation of the estimator ^ I(x;x). The same demonstration applies
















 =: ^ I(xk;xh)  I(xk;xh) ;h;k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg ;
where A [resp. B] is the number of unordered subsets of m(xk) [resp. m(xh)] integers taken without
replacement among the set of n(xk) [resp. n(xh)] elements. If Ukh represent unbiased estimators of




and where Fk [resp. Fh] is the c.d.f. of the population of group k [resp. h], then Ukk for all
k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg are one-sample U statistics and Ukh for all k 6= h 2 f1;2;:::;Kg are two-sample
U statistics. Note that two-sample U statistics require necessarily to respect SYMG when k 6= h
and that one-sample U statistics must respect SYMG when k = h. Then, Ukk and Ukh are asymp-
totically normal. Remark that the estimators of within- and between-group inequality components










consequently, these inequality components are asymptotically normal.
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